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Congo-Brazzaville is a small West African country with the economic potential 
for every citizen to live in comfortable wealth, but its current political context reads like a 
Hobbesian, dystopian novel. The United Nations lists the country at 137 on the Human 
Development Index. The irony is that the Congolese voice is missing or “disappeared” 
from most human rights coverage, academic literature and social research. 
This thesis therefore rests keenly on the logic of qualitative research. The 
Congolese diaspora seemed a trigger point, a way of contending with this disappearance 
and awakening the “voices from below”. By working with a small sample of the local 
diaspora, focusing on their stories and experiences, the work seeks to bring clarity and in-
depth understanding to their metaphysical hijack.1  
Surprisingly, what emerged were the false, dominant narratives that keep the 
Congolese psychologically, politically, and economically suppressed. Namely, 1) Congo 
is a poor nation, 2) colonialism is dead, 3) ethnic conflict is the cause of war, and 4) 
Congo has no future. This work shows how and why transitional justice can dismantle 
and transform these narratives, and offer a moment of reckoning. 
 
 
Key words: Congo-Brazzaville, diaspora, qualitative research, colonialism, ethnic 
conflict, narrative, emerging voices, transitional justice  
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Chapter 1: Why Congo? 
 
1.1 Primary Concerns 
 
“Congo is the poor guy sitting on a bag of gold, doesn’t know how rich he is.”2 
This is the metaphor of the Congolese identity in a perpetual existential crisis. When the 
Congolese tell their own story, more astonishing than their country’s unfortunate 
condition, is the poverty of identity and the ironic disposition of someone who does not 
know who he is, or what he has. This small West African country of approximately 5.2 
million3 has the economic potential for every citizen to live in comfortable wealth, but 
the current political context reads like a Hobbesian, dystopian novel with many dark 
chapters and multiple antagonists. Violence is of a different kind: a metaphysical hijack, 
an economic slavery. Today even civil servants are not getting their paychecks. Some 
have no clean water. Families take turns eating lunch and dinner because there’s not 
enough for everyone at each meal.4 The United Nations (UN) lists Congo-Brazzaville at 
137 on its Human Development Index to give “snapshots of current conditions as well as 
long-term trends”5 and yet this lack of basic human rights standards is a side effect of a 
much deeper illness.  
This country is situated within a broad narrative of powerful international actors, 
critical political turning points, recurring themes of endemic corruption and human rights 
violations. Need-based theories of conflict imply that when the basic human needs of the 
people are not being met, more conflict is inevitable.6 
UN stats do not reflect the deeper reality of why or how the current authoritarian 
regime has an unsustainable business model. Though facts are startling in their macro 
compression (as they should be), they do not give a full picture of the existential crisis of 
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the Congolese people or situate them in a specific colonial history. If we follow 
Foucault’s logic, it is necessary to investigate “how truth is constructed, who has the right 
to speak what counts as the truth, and who interpretations of reality are ignored, 
marginalized forgotten or disqualified as anecdotal or unscientific.”7 Most of the 
narratives in news headlines, humanitarian reports, international NGO memos, or UN 
documents are not expressed by Congolese persons or groups. The Congolese voice is not 
heard, or felt, in these spaces. This enables the contradiction with which Jean Paul Sartre 
charged colonialism: “laying claim to and denying the human condition at the same 
time”.8  
In light of this contradiction, the purpose of this work is to make the Congolese 
voice primary, give it resonance, and amplify it by using the methodology similar to a 
human rights investigator or researcher in a truth commission. It seemed necessary to ask 
the questions of the Congolese that no one was asking, and tell the stories of Congo that 
no one was telling.  
It cannot be said that voice does not matter, or that it is without power, otherwise 
an authoritarian regime would not be intent on crushing it. How I was telling the story of 
the Congolese diaspora therefore became a primary concern; the choice was intentional 
not to appropriate a distant academic or clinical voice, but to be keenly aware of my own 
voice, and to be sensitive to how I was telling this history, and why. My mother was the 
first of her family among twelve children to come to the United States from Congo, and 
she quickly became a gatekeeper to those in the Congolese community seeking asylum 
and refuge. Our home was filled with Congolese people whose lives were in transit. In 
the late 1990s, when violence erupted in Brazzaville, my 60-something-year-old 
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grandmother fled into Congo’s impenetrable Forest and subsisted on leaves, herbs, and 
bugs for months and months. Fear so ravaged the country that it was said the hair of 
children turned white. The shock of her survival: she arrived to the United States as a 
refugee, and I stared at what the odyssey had done to her feet.9  
As a half-Congolese, with an insider-outsider perspective, there was something 
meaningful at stake, and I wanted to approach it with the same urgency as Armenian poet 
Peter Balakian, when he conducted research on the Armenian genocide and the history of 
its denial:  “There are moments in the shape of the narrative and the drive of the history 
when opportunities present themselves, when you must resist the expository voice that is 
first instinct to those trained in purely academic ways. Those opportunities often revolve 
around a character, or an event that has expansive possibilities, a place connected to that 
event, a place you can inhabit with images of locale, narrative detail, voice, and 
dialogue.”10 These considerations have been a long-time personal and academic 
preoccupation, and in assuming this auto-ethnographic posture, the research was 
therefore urgent and primal.  
The Congolese diaspora seemed to me a trigger point, a way of awakening 
“voices from below” and exploring the potential of suppressed people to rise up.  What is 
the agency of people in repressed cultures? What are their hopes? What did they suffer? 
What voices were emerging? People who have suffered aggravated psychological, 
emotional, physical, and economic duress, need a moment of reckoning.    
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1.2 Defining The Diaspora 
 
I was part of the community, and yet at a distance from certain experiences of 
suffering in the troubled history of Congo.11 In search of first-generation diaspora more 
connected to this history, I was leaning on a robust definition: “What is at stake is the 
potential for diaspora to continue to be an enabling and productive critical term that 
connects histories of displacements with questions of power, identification, 
race/ethnicity, and citizenship (among others).”12  
In “problematizing history and creating interpretive perspectives”13 by focusing 
on this local community, I was led by a few questions: What are their preoccupations? 
What helps them to form a We the People? These questions brought me to the first shock 
– there was no “we”. The Congolese diaspora did not gather around a specific guiding 
principle, or philosophy, or even identify as a close-knit community. My first 
misconception was that there was a unified, coherent diaspora. 
One Congolese man was quite disconcerted at my mention of “the diaspora”. He 
asked for clarification: Which diaspora? What do you mean? And thereby quickly 
corrected me: “There is not one diaspora, there are two diasporas.” The two diasporas, 
two competing histories, are created by one divisive political structure. Power dynamics 
are reflected in the internal social conflicts and tensions within this group.  
I was looking for metaphors, images and ideas that bind the diaspora together; 
what I discovered were the dominant narratives that keep them divided and traumatized. 
To explore these new dimensions, it was critical to do two important things 
simultaneously. First, to keep hold of the human interest in the situation: portray people 
in their fullness, granting them their pasts, their futures, memories, hopes, opinions, and, 
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most especially, contradictions. And then second, engage the context analytically and 
honestly.14 In a suppressed community, identity is a framework that can be 
psychologically skewed or seemingly incongruent. Qualitative approaches to the how, 
why, and who, maintains a dialogue that is open to the contradictions, inconsistencies, 
and subversive patterns. 
The Congolese are shrewd, deeply analytical, taking nothing at face value. Their 
country has experienced abrupt levels of change, and in other ways, long seasons of 
stagnation. The changing rate of political regimes, and economic structures, is enough to 
confound even the most informed and vigilant citizen. A particular moment of implosion 
in the 1990s – a bloody coup – interrupted Congo’s first and final attempt at democracy. 
Framing this moment as a “civil war” implies that there were two groups within the 
population fighting, but this was not the case. The violence was an armed conflict among 
political elites, two opposing camps who occupied the capital city in a struggle for 
power.15 The civilians contained between the two camps suffered grave human rights 
abuses: from 1997-1998, there were losses of more than 14,000 people16 and internal 
displacement of 80,000.17 Different organizations report different numbers death tolls and 
displacements, but the Congolese diaspora find these numbers to be suspect, and claim 
that there were thousands, thousands more fatalities and IDPs. 
What has happened to the country after this implosion? What collapsed in the 
process? What was there, what was lost, where are we now? One group ran for their lives 
into exile. The common denominator among these escapees was that they were mostly 
from the South, the region where President Pascal Lissouba was from. The man staging 
the coup against this President was Denis Sassou Nguesso from the North. The uprisings 
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were not random acts of violence but occurred at a strategic point in Congo-Brazzaville’s 
history, when the hope and potential for democracy was ripe. Lissouba had won the first 
democratic election in the country, and a major tenet of his campaign was to secure 
economic freedom by making sure that the Congo kept a higher percentage of profits 
from oil markets in its agreements with France. Hannah Arendt argues that these kind of 
historic moments not only “immediately attract the potential or actual intervention of the 
superpowers, but their very conflicts, or at least the timing of their outbreaks, are suspect 
of having been manipulated or directly cause by interests and maneuvers that have 
nothing whatsoever to do with the conflicts and interests at stake in the region itself.”18 
The coup was a moment of implosion when all the subterranean elements came to the 
surface: Sassou succeeded in overthrowing President Lissouba and then declared himself 
President. It was the moment that halted Congo’s democracy in its infancy.  
For the past twenty-five years now, the Congolese have since had the same leader, 
who after he changed the Constitution to extend his term limits, became their President-
for-life. It is more proof for their resignation that nothing changes and that everything 
stays the same. The current government is a predatory structure that does not protect 
human rights or uphold dignity of the people. In fact, it is actually the most persistent 
abuser of human rights, and the people need to be protected from it.  
“Today if you go start challenging Sassou Nguesso, you only have two options: 
you get killed, or they arrest you and put you in jail,” said Hugo, who survived the 
conflict during the coup in 1997, and escaped Congo in 2001. He is still amazed that he 
lived to tell the story.19 “They own the economy. They own the army. They own the 
justice. So, Sassou Nguesso, normally, he is like the King of Congo. Even though the 
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Congo is a republic, but it’s being run as a kingdom. Because Sassou Nguesso decides 
who lives, who dies, who gets nominated, you know, in the leadership of the country.” 
Generations have spread their wings under these the two diasporas. You have 1) 
the diaspora who had to flee for their lives during the coup, and 2) the diaspora who 
maintain their livelihood from the current government administration. Power inequalities 
are sustained, not reversed, because of this schism. Such hierarchies inherently bring with 
it the nature of distrust, complicity, and corruption. For example, if you introduce 
yourself and share your family name with another Congolese person, they can usually 
distinguish your tribe, clan, what languages you speak, whether you are from the North or 
South, and potentially, your political affiliations. Common wisdom warns: Be aware of 
the difference. Know whom you are speaking to. The long-term effect of the staged coup 
was the collapse of trust within the Congolese community, and from that also emerged 
their deep pessimism of authority figures and political systems. The Congolese do not 
separate or compartmentalize the political from the personal. Politics is deeply personal. 
This is one reason that the Congolese remain guarded—the fear of being 
discovered by contending tribes, or by those in the community with opposing political 
views. Trust is on the reserve. It takes time to build equity in this community. It seemed, 
at first, that the diaspora were interested in conversation about Congo, but the moment 
they realized what the discussion would involve – politics, voicing their opinions, signing 
a document, the option of being audio recorded – they became scarce and difficult to 
reach. This was an important discovery: what I thought would be a simple process of 
finding and enrolling Congolese participants to share their story and voice their struggle, 
actually presented itself as a challenge.20  
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Cyr21 surprised me with his questions at our meeting: Do you work for the 
Congolese government? He watched me closely when I answered. Then: Will you send 
this to the Congolese government? Again, he studied me. His visible agitation about 
audio recording is something that was common with scheduling interviews. He declined 
to be recorded but shared deeply of his story.  
Cyr had participated in a protest against a sham Presidential election in Congo. 
For that, he spent four days in jail. At the time he had an internship with the Police Chief, 
and his political activity scared his boss, who did not offer him a long-term job. His 
father told him, You cannot stay here, it’s not safe. He came to United States in 2012 and 
then eventually submitted himself to the Survivors of Torture program at NYU’s 
Bellevue Hospital, where he shared his story with lawyers. He waited and waited and 
waited, and while he did so, he learned English, moved from job to job, worked in a 
restaurant, at a car wash, in a bakery, as an Uber driver. He joined a local association that 
gathers monthly called Africans United. Five-and-half years later he was granted asylum. 
He has not seen his wife or daughter in eight years.   
One might think that distance would allow for a vibrant intellectual and social 
space to express and encourage identity, but in some ways the diaspora is still in the grip 
of subversive elements. A conflict that began among political elites has deeply divided 
the civilian population, even the diaspora living outside of the country’s borders. The 
reason we do not hear a Greek chorus rising in protest as one voice is because they are 
not a people who are united, and they are without a grounded, conceptual framework of 
We the People. Within these social barriers, and power hierarchies, there appeared to be a 
very subdued civil society.  
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“You have to know why they hurt,” said David, a Congolese man who came alone 
to the United States at eighteen years old.22  “People are hurting.” David’s father was a 
pilot in the army and his mother was secretary in the army, both under the leadership of 
President Lissouba. He cannot return to the Congo, because of his last name, and because 
he resembles his father in appearance. “I don’t know where they buried my brother until 
today. It’s the feeling that is there…” 
The memory of the coup is enough to keep people subdued: “a fundamental 
difference between modern dictatorships and all other tyrannies of the past is that terror is 
no longer used as a means to exterminate and frighten opponents, but as an instrument to 
rule masses of people who are perfectly obedient.”23 The regime has succeeded in 
dividing the people – so that they are without a vibrant civil society.  
The regime does not tolerate contrary opinions. Consider the threat of retaliation 
for an offhand remark: the regime is known for snuffing out dissidents, arbitrary arrests, 
disappearances, and even sudden death. It has even been suggested that the regime has 
intelligence operatives working all over the world. It was not until later in our 
conversation that David revealed that he was actually a nephew to President Lissouba. 
(This seemed to be a metaphor for Congo. Everyone is somebody’s uncle. Congo seems 
like a village where everyone knows each other, where everyone is related.) After the 
success of the coup, the males in his family immediately became primary targets to the 
newly, self-asserted regime – even after they escaped Congo. He said, “Because my 
uncle, my father, they killed them outside of the country. It’s not that they was in the 
country. They followed them outside of the country because they knew those people 
could one day go back and get the power back. So. It’s painful. That’s why children of 
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those people, we are not talking. We are closing our voice because we still got pain inside 
us.” Whether the administration’s capacity to do so is true, or not, it has succeeded in 
making a diaspora community believe that it is possible, and in fact, probable.  
The fear of current regime has grown to mythic proportions. These dominant 
narratives ultimately dilute, diminish or delete the potential of emerging voices or rising 
leaders. Confronted with the overwhelming sense of proportions in these narratives, one 
is disoriented. That is the true purpose of such narratives – fear, speechlessness, 
submission.  
 
1.3 The Roadmap 
 
History has always involved very strong power relations (victor/loser, 
oppressor/oppressed, narrator/pawn), especially concerning critiques about who is 
reading, writing, and living it.24 This work attempts to “explode clichés and break apart 
simplifying and misleading frames” of Congo’s recent history.25 Essential considerations 
include looking at the dominant narratives26 and “the unpremeditated, attentive facing up 
to, and resisting”27 them. What are the dominant narratives? Why are they present? What 
are they hiding? These narratives succeed in keeping the Congolese both psychologically, 
politically, and economically suppressed. These need to be confronted28 and this will 
focus on deconstructing the following dominant narratives: 
1. Congo is a poor nation 
2. Colonialism is dead 
3. Ethnic conflict is the cause of war  
4. Congo has no future 
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The above will serve as an analytical roadmap to arrive at why transitional justice will be 
a critical vehicle of the Congolese voices confronting these narratives.  
“Attention needs to focus on how truth is refracted through other priorities and 
agendas”29 as these dominant narratives have an architecture that ultimately serve a 
purpose. These “enabling fictions”30 (to borrow the phrase from the scholar Joseph 
Slaughter) in their conception and performance are intentional. This suggests that the 
behavior of the current regime in Congo is not mere ineptitude on behalf of its leaders, 
but is actually part of a long-term strategy in which powerful international actors receive 
the benefits, and the Congolese people suffer. It is important to do an analysis of these 
enabling partners, and this means taking a look at who is in power? Who, after certain 
events, or turning points, is growing in power? And finally, this dares to interrogate those 
agents of power that often go unchallenged.  
This work will pivot around these dominant narratives to arrive at why transitional 
justice is so critical to this conversation about Congo and the diaspora. Such a mechanism 
directly approaches the dominant narratives in order to dismantle them. 
 
1.4 Why Transitional Justice? 
 
Transitional justice presents both dilemmas and opportunities. The questions 
unfold – what is the mechanism within this field that is unapologetic about dealing with 
difficult questions? Unafraid to confront systemic corruption? Deals with hope for the 
future? According to Priscilla Hayner in her book Unspeakable Truths, truth 
commissions are the “official bodies set up to investigate and report on a pattern of past 
human rights abuses.”31 “Transitional justice asks the most difficult questions imaginable 
about law and politics”32 and doesn’t run from complexity. Truth commissions explore 
	 15 
“the difficult underside of these questions” in order to understand “how states and 
individuals might reckon with horrible abuses of the past”. 33  
The urgency of this discussion comes at a moment of two great reveals, of which 
the Congolese diaspora have been aware of for many years. The Guardian34 exposed 
President Sassou Nguesso’s son of stealing $50 million from Congo’s treasury and hiding 
the funds in private accounts, and the Corruption Investigations Team at Global Witness35 
did an in-depth investigation into the lucrative spending habits of the Presidential family 
and his administration. Organizations such as Global Witness approach the questions 
publicly that the diaspora have wondered in private: Where has all of Congo’s money 
gone?36 If Congo has no money, what are these recent discoveries of multi-million-dollar 
accounts? The diaspora claim that they were made to believe that Congo has no money. 
But they suspect that millions and millions of dollars from Congo have been siphoned to 
different parts of the globe.  
Perhaps the most crucial element of a truth commission: “The official and public 
recognition of past abuses serves to effectively un-silence a topic that might otherwise be 
spoken of only in hushed tones, long considered too dangerous for general conversation, 
rarely reported honestly in the press, and certainly out of bounds of the official history 
taught in schools. In effect, the report of a truth commission reclaims a country’s history 
and opens it for public review.”37 
A truth commission may offer a moment of reckoning for the Congolese diaspora. 
As a mechanism than can adapt to different situations or regions, the diaspora can occupy 
this space in creative and innovative ways, and bring the Congolese voice onto a public 
platform. A commission of inquiry, particularly examining the democratic implosion in 
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the 1990s and the repressive administration that asserted itself since that historic fallout, 
might give Congo the agility and resilience needed to guide its future.  
Transitional justice has confronted some of the most authoritarian regimes, 
defunct political systems, and abysmal human rights conditions. Its versatility has the 
potential to dismantle dominant narratives, unearth suppressed voices, and offer creative 
paths forward for Congo, and her diaspora. Truth-seeking, or fact-finding, processes of 
human rights violations by non-judicial bodies can take many shapes and forms, but often 
they look at events holistically, both their causes and impacts.38 The function and purpose 
of transitional justice is that the dominant narrative, often the voice of the oppressor, is 




Chapter 2: Colonialism and the Poverty Narrative	
2.1 Is Colonialism Dead? 
 
The Leviathan of dominant narratives in the Congo is that colonialism is dead. 
This is a primary contention that needs to be addressed, according to the diaspora. It is a 
topic that came up in virtually every conversation concerning Congo’s politics. The 
diaspora say: France was our colonizer. They are still present in Brazza. Anything 
happens, France knows. We cannot really talk about the political freedom or 
independence.39 This perception tunnels through these Congolese voices to challenge 
dominant narratives and explore why they exist. The dominant narratives do well to hide 
a subversive reality – they not only obscure meaningful subtext and voices, but are a 
source of harm; or in the words of G.K. Chesterton, “everything is prolonging its 
existence by denying it exists”.40  
It is therefore critical to disrupt this dominant narrative by bringing attention to 
power hierarchies. The most pressing and urgent hierarchy to approach is Congo’s 
colonial history and the “lingering forms of colonial authority”.41 Postcolonial theory 
claims that “the world we inhabit is impossible to understand except in relationship to the 
history of imperialism and colonial rule.”42 This means that it is impossible to conceive 
of Congo-Brazzaville’s current state of fragility, structural inertia, monstrous debt, and 
endemic corruption, in the absence of France’s colonial encounters and oppression.43 
Without this kind of analysis, the danger is in managing the symptoms of the Congolese 
problem, and never striking a deathblow at the root. 
1960 is often celebrated as the “Year of Africa” and on August 15 of that year, 
Congo took a quantum leap forward in proclaiming its independence, but tethered this 
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leap by signing agreements for continued defense and cooperation with France.44 This 
association between France and her former African colonies is known as Françafrique: a 
term coined to maintain a subversive continuity.45  More than 50 years after 
independence, this continuity is still surprisingly alive and vibrant, “accepted by and 
acceptable to both France and the Francophone Africa.”46 
The language itself is revealing. Françafrique is French wordplay for 
Francophone Africa, but it also sounds like the phrase France à fric, which literally 
means France on the take for cash.47 In an article by the same title, scholar Ian Taylor 
suggests that this rhetoric is no accident. His research shows that “of all the former 
colonial powers in Africa, France has retained the most intense political, social, economic 
and culturally intense ties after independence, early on recognized as being neocolonial in 
nature.”48 In this hierarchy, France is the writer of the Congolese story, and the shaper of 
its culture, politics, and economy, to guarantee easy access to rich natural resources and 
lucrative markets in Africa.49 “French don’t produce for themselves – don’t have the 
materials to build up everything in the country,” said David. “They set up politics that 
bring them what they need.”  
This work is a counter-narrative to the notion that France is an “ideological 
scapegoat”50 for Congo-Brazzaville and its concerns. Quite the contrary, according to the 
diaspora, most problems and troubling questions stem from this point of origin. This 
critique is in an attempt at decolonizing such dominant frameworks; to confront and 
deconstruct this meta-narrative of Françafrique; that is to say, neocolonialism does not 
only operate in economics, politics, infrastructure, but operates in who is writing history, 
	 19 
who is telling it, and how people conceptualize the problem of Congo or the Congolese 




Françafrique markets itself as a “special relationship”51 – a mutually beneficial 
agreement that is sophisticated, stable and desirable by both France and Africa. The 
notion of Congo’s independence is fiercely contested by the diaspora. They contend that 
their economy is in “intensive care” and has been for many years, and that, in reality, 
Congo is a particular kind of slave. One of the clearest expressions of this slavery is 
Congo vis-à-vis the CFA currency52 – the monetary policy that France has used to anchor 
itself in African zones post-independence. The special relationship subverts the fact that 
the genesis of the CFA is colonial53 and “that the French ruling elites never equated 
decolonization with retreat, nor fully accepted the idea of African independence”.54 
Neocolonialism hides itself in the very marrow of this special relationship. 
Patrice55 is a Congolese man who served as a junior advisor to the prime minister 
of Congo in the late 1980s before moving to the United States. He knows Congo’s 
internal machinery, the mentality behind its government leaders, and has seen both the 
hope and the dark side of politics. He has kept a keen, steadfast gaze on the Congo from 
abroad for more than 30 years. His experiences working in government reinforce that the 
CFA is subservient in many forms, and that the real buying power is in the French 
universe. “Francophone African countries are not totally in control of their own 
currencies,” he said. He cites examples that illustrate that the CFA is a blatant example of 
functioning neocolonialism and an intentional tool to keep Congo underdeveloped.56 For 
example: 1) CFA money is made and printed in France. 2) The currency itself is 
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impotent. 3) CFA operates exactly the same way the Nazis operated economic systems. 
The diaspora use strong language in to describe Congo’s situation, because they live 
within the subtext that no one is reading.  News articles have also referred to the CFA as 
“monetary Nazism”57 in which Congo is “de jure independent” but in reality deeply 
constrained through economic policy directed by France.58 Patrice said, “If you are an 
independent country, how would you explain that? You know, that another country 
would keep some of your money?” 
Congo was bringing in the rich supply of her resources to French institutions. In 
particular, Patrice noted that during his civil service term, the French kept one-third of the 
revenues from the Congolese treasury during oil, wood, and mineral deals. “It is not for 
you to make the final decision,” Patrice said about Congo’s dealings with France. “It is 
for them to make the final decision on what you can buy or not.” Others from the 
diaspora have shared that when the time comes to make executive decisions, Congo must 
ask preliminary questions: Can we do this? Will it have an impact on French interests? 
That is to say, France has veto power.59 The subliminal message is that France brings 
stability and economic force, and that Congo would never be able to operate without 
France. The diaspora claim it is a false independence because France guides everything 
remotely. 
How does France get away with it? It is a central question that scholars like Tamar 
Golan (among other international journalists and African dissidents) have been asking for 
more than 30 years. Golan cites an important tenet of how Françafrique works: most of 
the former French colonies are states are relatively small and have populations never 
exceeding five million, as in Congo.60 She emphasizes that “the French political system, 
	 21 
which was transplanted to its African colonies, is a centralized system which has not 
tolerated the separate development of its ethnic components.”61 
Patrice explains that Congo develops French industry to its own detriment, and 
that true cost of these transactions is the erosion of Congolese culture and identity. “They 
always say that it’s important to know who you are. You know, your identity,” he said. 
“And I believe that one of the things that have caused many of us in, especially in 
Francophone Africa, to completely lose our way, is also because we have lost what our 
true identity is.”  
“In the case of the Congo, for example, we literally have destroyed our own 
country. And that has to do with the fact that, you know, in the late 60s, you know, we 
became a revolutionary country. I mean, we joined, you know, the revolutionary 
movements of a lot of communist countries, and many things like that. And leaders used 
that culture to really take control of the economy, the political arena and even the 
culture… You had to identify – literally renounce to your own culture – and identify as 
the culture of the moment.” 
“Majority of Congolese today, are people, really I can say, they are like naked 
culturally, you know, and that also has an impact on the way they behave, you know, on 
what they believe in.” 
Patrice is skeptical of the notion of rising voices as way to respond to this kind of 
tyranny. Are voices enough? A greater impact, he suggests, would be for African expats 
who own big companies to can make a political protest by potentially paralyzing a sector 
of the economy. “What is missing in the Congolese economy is free enterprise,” he said. 
He admits this is difficult to navigate because the current regime has a firm grip in every 
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sector in the society. People have to struggle their way through many obstacles. “There’s 
nothing to encourage people to invest into the private sector to become business owners.” 
His point: France pays attention to the economy, and it will pay attention to anything that 
can destabilize it.  
 
2.3 Complicity	
Once again, how does France get away with it? It would be erroneous to deny the 
complicity of Congolese leadership. Given the insecurity of most African regimes where 
survival is key, 62  the role of the African elites perpetuating dependency with France 
cannot be underestimated.63 Such networks can only be thoroughly administered with the 
help of insiders, which is ultimately counter to the interest of their own countries and 
their own people. 64 The irony is that even Congolese elites become victims in the context 
of neocolonialism. 
This topic of complicity is salient in a very sensitive market in Congo – oil 
production. The story goes that in West African oil zones, “economics is politics”.65 
Congo-Brazzaville is the fourth largest producer of oil in the African continent66 and “oil 
has pumped steadily through decolonization, nationalizations, Marxism-Leninism, coups 
and civil wars since it was discovered in the 1950s.”67 Omar Bongo, the former President 
of Gabon, the neighboring oil-rich African country in the CFA zone, has said: “Africa 
without France is a car without a driver. France without Africa is a car without petrol.”68  
The oil market is a haven for corruption:69 “The huge complexity of energy 
markets, and the benefits that market participants can derive from their secrecy, partly 
explain why it is so hard to bring about transparency in the oil industry.”70 It lacks proper 
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governance; it experiences high levels of capital flight; tracking systems are ephemeral; 
lines of legality are blurry. For more than 30 years, historians have taken note that “the 
vastly increased royalties flowing into the treasury have been squandered by corruption, 
embezzlement and the erection of a large inefficient, deficitory State sector.” 71 The 
bottom-line: nobody knows exactly where the oil money is going.72 
“All the problems in Congo is the mismanagement of resources,” said Maurice,73 
a Congolese man who has fifteen years of experience as a Professor of Economics at a 
state university in the U.S. After the coup in the late-1990s, he requested asylum because 
his middle name put him on the blacklist with the regime in power. He speaks not only of 
the economic failures that produce poverty, but also of a systemic moral failure in the 
society. Who benefits from this dysfunction? What power do they have? He said, it is an 
autocratic system where one person is king, and the President, his family, and their 
supporters control the finance sector. “Anyone who is Chief of Department is corrupt,” 
he said. “They use this money for their own benefit.” These failures are not isolated 
events in economy, politics, or civil society. That is to say, corruption is a way of life.  
Before he came to the United States in the 1990s, Roland74 was hired as an 
engineer by the mammoth French oil company called Elf in Congo. He tells the story of 
how he was a witness to their practices: “It’s highly, highly painful, and actually that is 
one of the reasons why I couldn’t stay there.” 
 “I was working at the French company that is actually responsible of, you know, 
basically, taking over the Congolese oil…” Roland said. “My job was two times a month, 
I will go in high sea and go stay on a tanker, you know, the oil tanker? It’s a huge, huge, 
huge boat that come over from Europe and then we declared the pipe. For three days they 
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pull the oil and put it to the tanker and leave. So, my job will be to go to the – on that 
tanker when they arrive – and I got a laptop, and basically, I put up my laptop to the pipe 
so I, you know, I’m going to get how much oil they are – you know – they are pumping.” 
“So, when you see all those riches, and when you go back on land, and you see 
how much the population suffering, and then you see all these French people that are 
your colleagues, how rich, how much money they have, and how much it doesn’t profit 
the society.” Roland stayed with Elf for one year before moving to the States and work as 
a computer engineer. He chose not to go to France where there was, and still is, a vibrant 
Congolese community.  
As a witness to the underdevelopment, the lack of infrastructure, and the weak 
institutions in Congo, in comparison to the veritable wealth of oil markets, Roland 
implies that you can see something is wrong with the system, that they have no respect or 
consideration for the Congolese people. One Congolese man used a French term to 
describe the system – escroquerie – that speaks to the various kinds of subversive 
methods used by someone who wants to steal from you. The diaspora believe that Elf had 
a lot of influence, it could even topple governments. Others have written: “Elf is not just 
an oil company but a parallel diplomacy to control certain African states.”75 
Hence the diaspora have a deep suspicion and distrust of leadership in most of its 
forms. They argue that because France still exercises a lot of power in economy and 
politics, by that logic, the Head of States in all of the former colonies are subservient to 
France in one way or another. They say: France supports the current political leadership, 
and if France did not, those persons would not be in leadership. The troubling subtext is 
that France enables authoritarian regimes to maintain their posts.  
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These systems claim to be a source of stability, but inevitably become an external 
force that causes Congo’s internal organs to dysfunction.  
“The Congolese people do not know much about how much our country 
receives from this black gold, and even less about how the revenues are 
managed,” Congolese church leaders wrote in an open letter. “What it 
does know is that the price of oil is measured not in barrels or dollars, but 
in suffering, misery, successive wars, blood, displacement of people, exile, 
unemployment.”76 
Connecting the dots between natural resources and political power suggests that these 
dynamics create a space that allows for major human rights concerns. The repercussions 
are bifurcated extremes: lucrative wealth for a small margin of Congolese elites and 
extreme poverty for the masses. 
 
2.4 The Poverty Narrative 
	
The Congolese people are never the recipients of the oil or natural resource 
markets in the country. Here we arrive at the second dominant narrative – that of Congo’s 
poverty – met with irony by her diaspora. The diaspora say: If profits were as evenly 
distributed, everybody would be like a small Kuwait. If it was a well-managed country, 
the Congo could be just like Dubai. They challenge the narrative of Congo as a poor 
nation. They claim that Congo is a poorly managed nation. Who, then, benefits from the 
poverty narrative? Why is it convincing? What does it protect? According to the diaspora, 
there should have been a line of questioning about this narrative: If oil markets are 
lucrative, why are people without water in the country? Why is there no infrastructure? 
Why are civil servants delayed six months of salary?  
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The diaspora claim that the state of Congo is not the result of mere incompetence, 
but the result of very shrewd leaders making corrupt decisions in a cycle of broken 
systems. Patrice said, “That’s also by design because the more people are uneducated, the 
more they are followers. They have no way of reasoning on their own and reflecting on 
their conditions.” The logic of this narrative trajectory suggests that Congo requires third-
party intervention from outside of its borders, that it needs a colonial authority to lift it 
out of the depths of poverty. A deeper analysis reveals that France is in large part 
responsible for the instability and insecurity. The economic climate and lack of basic 
human rights standards is but evidence of these political realities. 
The reality of Congo’s wealth is obscured by the fiction of her poverty. This is not 
an attempt to deny the existence of poverty among the Congolese people, but to bring 
attention its true cause, and to illuminate that the Congolese experience is paradoxical in 
relationship to Congo’s wealth streams. The scholarship around this subject of corruption 
and mismanagement gives it a name: the “paradox of plenty” or the “resource curse”. The 
dominant narrative is that poverty in its “open-endedness, ambiguity, and non-
resolution”77 is Congo’s identity, predilection, and destiny. These dominant narratives are 
damaging to the way the Congolese person and the outsider orient themselves toward 
problem solving; the subversion of the real problem obscures the path to its resolution. 
The Congolese diaspora must contend with these narratives, whether they are true or 
otherwise. These narratives are how they are identified, by which they suffer, and to 
which they have succumbed in one way or another. They shrink the perspective of what 
is possible for Congo and offer no clear vision for her tomorrows.  
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Chapter 3: The Distortion of Ethnic Conflict  
 
3.1 Tribes and Culture 
 
The Kingdom of Congo was a well-organized region in six provinces before the 
Europeans came and scrambled it, said Hubert.78 There is not much written history about 
the origin of the Congo, but its people are walking history books. They carry stories, 
knowledge, history, myths, and culture through oral traditions passed through 
generations. Through these traditions you can track the animating cultural metaphors and 
how they create meaning in the telling and re-telling of their stories. Hubert, for example, 
is from the Bakuni tribe in the South, also the same name for its tribal language. Bakuni 
means farmer, a connotation that refers to an intensely dynamic link to the earth. The 
verb form, kukuna, means the planter. Bakikila is the name of his clan, which refers to the 
organization of one or more tribes. There are more than fifty dialects in the Congo.79 
Though Hubert has been living in New York since the 1990s, he speaks multiple dialects 
such as Bakuni, Kikongo, Lingala, Balumbu, Babwisi, as well European languages such 
as Romanian, French, and English. “I know where I come from,” he said. “I know where 
we stand.”  
 “The clan determines your legacy,” said Hubert. “This river belongs to you, this 
forest belongs to me. Each clan knows how to respect what belongs to the other clan. For 
example, you cannot hunt in my forest without my permission.” His cultural knowledge 
and experiences challenge the notion of pre-existing divisions. Knowing who you are, 
where you come from, and where you stand is a critical part of the cultural currency. This 
is a cultural version of human rights language – the concept of respect – respecting the 
dignity and rights of the neighboring tribe. Congo is a land rich in natural resources, 
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minerals, oil, timber, and fertile soil. It hosts various landscapes, plains and mountains 
and valleys, the sea at its western border, the rainforest along its eastern border, the 
Congo River curves alongside its capital, Brazzaville. The land was divided in such as a 
way that there was a fundamental equilibrium among tribes. At its essence was respect, 
not a competition for power. Their knowledge of the country’s origin, history and culture 
point to the notion that the “ethnicities in and of themselves are not problematic”.80 
Tunneling through the stories of the diaspora, this work argues that the framing of 
Congo’s violence in 1997 as a “civil war” is a major pivot point for false narratives, 
corrupt data, and egregious human rights abuses in the country. This event, and the re-
telling of it as an internal ethnic conflict, damaged the reality of peacefully abiding tribes. 
The civilian population took the brunt of violence – physical, emotional, psychological 
and financial – and the diaspora are living proof of “how much a difficult past was still 
unresolved, both emotionally and factually.”81   
 
3.2 Inside the Coup 
 
Pascal Lissouba was elected President by the majority of the Congolese 
population in the first-ever democratic election in 1992, a moment of great hope after 
many years of socialism. He was considered, David said, “someone that was a type of 
Gandhi for our country, a Nelson Mandela for our country.” For a majority of the 
population, he represented something bigger than themselves, a way of re-imagining 
Congo and building the country for the benefit of the people. Congo had been steeped in 
militant communism and single-party government for the thirty years preceding 
Lissouba’s presidency from 1992-1996. The country’s next democratic election was 
scheduled for 1997.  
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Denis Sassou Nguesso, whose Marxist politics and Presidential seat had been 
overturned in the 1992 democratic elections, returned from France in 1997. He returned 
with militia, political backing, and economic force. After his arrival, Brazzaville was at 
its highest point of tension. The city was on lockdown, broken up into different camps, 
Sassou’s rebel troops called the Cobras in one section of the city, and Lissouba’s 
government troops holding fort in the other. The civilian population was in the middle of 
the triage. “I was in the crossfire,” said Hugo. “In the middle between the government 
and Sassou’s rebels.” There were moments where he didn’t leave the house for three days 
at a time. He watched people dying in the streets. At one point he couldn’t take anymore 
of the inhumanity, and buried a dead person before the dogs could eat the body. The 
political power struggles turned the city into what Hugo refers to as No Man’s Land. 
Most of the escapees from that period were from the South, where President Lissouba 
was from. Sassou was from the North. The war ended in a successful coup d’état by 
Sassou. The division between the North and the South became much more pronounced 
after these events.82 
The Congolese were a peaceful people, in the words of Marien.83 “We never 
knew war,” she said. “Chad, Angola – they knew war.” Her reference is to the 
surrounding countries that supported rebel groups with militia and weapons. Child 
number seven of eight children, she was born in Dolesi, from the Bembe tribe, in the 
1960s, and left Congo in 1987. Her political life died, she said, when her brother died. 
Her brother was very active in politics, and so she was very informed of the nuances 
within the conflict. The Congolese were not as equipped with the necessities for armed 
conflict, according to the diaspora. Such events deserve a line of questioning: Who 
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financed the rebel groups? Where did the military arms coming from? Understand where 
the key players are coming from, and why, and what are their motives. Consider the 
timing of the coup: right before the second democratic election of the entire country. It 
was within this context, where people were targeted because of their ethnic tribe, but it 
was not the origin of the conflict in itself. It was the symptom of a larger, broader 
problem. 
“Today is quiet. But division is so quiet,” said Marien. In other words, people stick 
more to their own tribe. The political machine has heightened the sense of tribalism to an 
extreme. Deeply tribal instincts are skewed in Congolese politics, in which “ethnicity is 
both a device and focus for group mobilization by political actors who seek to protect 
their own well-being and to gain political and economic advantages.” 84 Common 
denominators reveal themselves through the following: Who is at risk? Who is benefiting 
from the current regime? Today jobs can be given or not given, based on last name, 
ethnic tribe, or whether a person is from the North or South. Today those in power keep 
the influence, power and financial benefits within their own tribe, at the expense of the 
wellness of the majority in the country. Today the context reflects Michael Hechtor’s 
theory of internal colonialism in which “the dominant group regulates the allocations of 
social roles in such a way that those roles commonly considered to be of high prestige are 
reserved for its members, while those of lower prestige go to members of the subordinate 
group”.85  The conflict that began from the top politically, produced a horizontal conflict, 
neighbor against neighbor, tribe against tribe.  
The framing of 1997 event as a civil war is misleading in the following respects: 
it denies the truth that certain groups were fueled, financed and fortified by other armies 
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or governments at large; it doesn’t acknowledge Congo’s colonial history as an active 
thorn in its democratic attempts; it pits the conflict between ethnic groups, rather than as 
an international struggle for power and natural resources. Today France is in a long-term 
political and economic relationship with the man who overthrew the first and only 
democratically elected President in Congo’s history. 
 
3.3 The Distortion of Ethnic Conflict 
The dominant narrative of ethnic conflict in Congo-Brazzaville obscures the 
presence of international stakeholders in the country. There are many moving parts, and 
this narrative takes away the spotlight from those stakeholders. Such a perspective 
implies that an internal war requires an internal resolution, and absolves the international 
community from any responsibility. This is symptomatic of colonial legacies in African 
contexts, in which the problems are disconnected from the original sin. Ethnic tension, in 
actuality or in hyperbole, is a part of the package of suffering inherited from legacies of 
colonial regimes. The other parts of suffering include corruption, lack of development, 
and poor human rights standards.86 
“There is no ethnic conflict in the Congo,” said Gael.87 “There is political 
[leaders] who use ethnic differences for their own means.” He is a young Congolese man 
with a last name that identifies him as belonging to the same tribe as Congo’s current 
President-for-Life, who changed the constitution to continue his term of service ad 
infinitum. Growing up, he was keenly aware of identity: who you are, where you belong, 
where you don’t belong. Today he is consistently confronting stereotypes, both about his 
own political beliefs and the way others perceive of him. He avoids diaspora events 
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because he gets targeted when they hear his last name – Sassou pays your bills, is a 
recurring accusation. However, his distrust in the current regime began with the historic 
event of The Disappeared of the Beach,88 a moment in which subversive currents broke 
the surface and shook the Congolese community. Congo-Brazzaville had signed an 
agreement with the Democratic Republic of Congo and the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees, to accept the refugees who had run to the neighboring region for safety; 
hundreds of Congolese civilians returned to port on Brazzaville’s beach, and there they 
were separated into groups, killed, or disappeared.89 This was a rude awakening for Gael 
– suddenly his government, his tribe, was killing young people.  
It is a difficult contention for a Congolese person to distance himself from his 
own tribe, particularly when that tribe is ruling the country. Gael explains that his 
paradigm shift occurred when he got a scholarship to study in Morocco, and had to share 
a house with two other young men. They were all from three different Congolese tribes – 
Lari, Mbembe, Mbochi – coming from three different regions of the country. “So after 
we were living together, that’s when I saw that they are people. They are like me. And we 
all had that same love for the country,” said EM. “I saw from them that they are also 
patriots, as me, but with the only slight difference, that we were not from the same tribe. 
And I saw that we all had the same fear – that same fear – of you’re going to kill me.”  
“This is something that helped me develop, and get out of this box of always 
thinking the other side as being part of the problem,” he said. The house in Morocco 
provided the time and space to uncover difficult histories and common misperceptions, to 
recognize the false construction of The Other, and to read the narrative of ethnic conflict 
as a distortion. The consequence of this narrative is that the diaspora is divided, fed up, 
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and without love for their country. “It’s like a divorce,” Gael said. “We need to go deep 
to find a common identity – that we are all Congolese – that the country is ours, like it or 
not.” After that experience, he switched his position. It is one of the reasons that inspired 
him to attend a master’s program in Conflict Resolution at an American university: “I 
really want to advocate for unity.” Today his father is still a general under President 
Sassou Nguesso, but his goal is to work with young Congolese people for the integration 
of all tribes and for the future of a unified Congo.  
Ethnic conflict is a popular narrative with Biblical proportions. This is the 
narrative that the diaspora have to contend with. Ethnic conflict is digestible because it 
recurs as an ancient and primal theme in history: consider ancient texts and the stories of 
Abraham, Isaac, and Ishmael; consider Jacob and his twelve sons; consider all the tribal 
conflict that ensued from these families. Dysfunction seems to be a particular recurring 
theme in the African context.  The power of this narrative lies in its implicit believability, 
and is part of the reason that it remains largely unchallenged.  
 
3.4 One Congo  
 
How do you challenge something as subterranean as ethnic conflict? The damage 
is compounded into a specific kind of internal violence – psychological trauma – and its 
ability to maintain division and subjugation. It complicates finding the “truth” that the 
diaspora already know: ethnic conflict is a social construction that accompanies struggles 
among ethnic groups for the control of the state.90 Those in positions of power use this 
deep-rooted cultural premise as a tool to maintain the status quo. Such constructions have 
intentions and goals that severely aggravate the concept of We the People.  
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Congo as a sovereign reveals a short, but difficult and violent history. As a young 
country, Congo has had only six Presidents; most of whom made violent entries into the 
political scene; four of whom were systematically annihilated. A UN Refugee Agency 
report documented that the Presidency was a throne in the “fight for power between elite 
leaders who wanted to maintain or retake power within a one-party state. Contrary to a 
widespread perception, the conflict is not a tribal one; ethnic groups were and are 
manipulated into fighting for one or the other of the elite leaders.”91 The diaspora 
advocate the need for a historical lens in an analysis of Congo’s current plight. They 
make the following considerations: Are African countries truly sovereign? Is the concept 
of nationality a Western concept? Is it in the interests of certain Western actors to 
maintain a level of division between ethnic groups?92  
After independence in 1960, countries like the Congo had newly-formed 
governments that faced great challenges.93 Conceptual frameworks on the roots of this 
kind of conflict show that colonialism formed multi-ethnic states in Africa without 
creating any effective social, cultural or political mechanisms to unify these different 
ethnic groups.94 Today, the notion of Congo under one nation, one flag, and one leader, is 
difficult to conceptualize because politics have perverted tribalism in such a way as to re-




Chapter 4: The Catch-22 of Human Rights 
 
4.1 Who Suffers? 
 
The civilian population suffered the most from these political events, and the 
narratives told about the events. “It’s a very, very rich country, holding the poorest 
people on earth, and that’s uncomfortable,” said Hugo. “You cannot live with your quiet 
mind with that kind of statistic in your head.”  
Hugo was part of a local NGO in Congo called the UN Congolese Association. 
They hid in the UN bureau during the cycles of violence in Brazzaville in 1997 so that 
they could convey information to the UN, and to exiles in different parts of the world. 
The struggle was: how to make public what was happening in the country without 
themselves being compromised?  “The goal of that association was to promote everything 
that the UN is for, mostly when it comes to the protection of human rights, and all those 
kind of things.” They worked hard to promote the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR). “And because of what was going on in Congo, we didn’t have a choice 
but to protest and bring up all the violations that were going on.”  
In September 2001, Hugo was invited to attend a UN conference in New York 
concerning these human rights violations that were happening in Congo. The conference 
was cancelled, however, after the terrorist attacks on September 11, and there were no 
flights going in or out of the U.S. Word eventually got out in Brazzaville that people were 
“bad-mouthing” the government, in October of that year he escaped with a visa to the 
U.S. and sought political asylum.   
Today he is connected with Congolese diaspora in Canada, England, France, 
South Africa. Stateside, he gathers people together weekly by conference call to discuss 
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ways that they can make public protest or lobby the U.S. government for the sake of the 
Congo and her diaspora. Conversations like these led to a new discovery: not everyone in 
Congo or in the diaspora community is silent. They have an outspoken social media 
community of dissent and protest: for example, Ras-Le-Bol, based on the French slang to 
express the notion of “I’ve had enough!” is the name of Congo-based group of young 
people in non-violent protest to awaken the conscience of their fellow citizens; Les 
Indignés du 242 is a Congolese diaspora group voicing its indignation against the 
dictator. Every so often, these voices emerge from the background and come into the 
foreground. This complicated the notion of the Congolese as silent, subdued community. 
And my initial question of, Why are the Congolese not talking? eventually evolved into 
Why isn’t anyone listening? 
The only problem is that the dissidents and protestors in civil society seem 
disconnected from one another. There is not a unified chorus of dissent. This is a 
profound concern for human rights in the context of a fragile state because the “basic 
characteristic of the victim is powerlessness, an inability for self-defense against the state 
or the culture in question.”95 It is most evident in the human rights violations, and 
breaches in international norms and customary law, and the lack of precaution among 
political elites to protect civilians. Doctors Without Borders released a special report 
entitled “Congo-Brazzaville: Chronicle of a Forgotten War” in documenting the events of 
the late 1990s:  
“This fighting has generated massive and blind atrocities against civilian 
populations. The resulting widespread violence perpetrated by the parties 
at war affects the entire civilian population. Arbitrary executions, 
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mutilations, rapes, and disappearances illustrate the arbitrary character of 
the violence perpetrated against the civilians.”96 
[…] 
“Until now, no party in the conflict has taken significant steps to prevent 
the violence against civilians. This lack of action clearly shows their 
indifference to the fate of the civilian population. Given the gravity of the 
situation, the silence and indifference of the international community is 
unbearable.” 97  
“We think the UN is for us but when you’re going through all these troubles you 
question yourself. Where is the human rights in the world? We read it in books, we watch 
it on the TV, but where are they now?” said David, who left a family back home that 
endured great suffering when he came to the U.S. many years ago. “Today they continue 
to kill people, nobody is saying anything about it.”  
The UDHR articulates noble, moral aspirations that speaks to the core of what it 
means to be human and “the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy 
freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want”98 – but more than 70 
years after its adoption by the UN General Assembly in 1948, it is still without the 
practical measures to ensure these rights for all people. Research and history have shown 
that poor human rights records are often in weak or failing states.99 The human rights 
wreckage in Congo since the 1990s includes, but is not limited to:  
§ Political violence – disappearances, killing, jail, rape  
§ Corruption – economic slavery, poverty   
§ Quality of life – lack of food, water, healthcare, and education 
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The history of Congo demonstrates why the human rights framework in its current 
application is deeply problematic. 
 
4.2 The Catch-22 of Human Rights 
According to research on state capacity, “if the weakness of the state itself leads 
to human rights abuses, this has an important implication for where the blame should be 
lodged and how problems can be best addressed.”100 The human rights framework does 
not consider when the government supports an international ecosystem that creates poor 
human rights standards, or when the government is the principal violator of human rights 
of its people. Legal scholar Makau Mutua, particularly outspoken in intellectual 
scholarship known as Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), 
thoroughly unpacks these theoretical flaws: “The state is the guarantor of human rights,” 
he claims. “It is also the target and raison d’être of human rights law.”101  
The human rights movement makes a claim on the dignity of life, but in the 
Congo, this right cannot be protected or corrected in its breach. What mechanism is there 
to ensure these claims? The human rights regime attributes the responsibility of enforcing 
human rights to the nation/sovereign; therefore Congo-Brazzaville has a double 
contradiction, not only is it a fragile state that is unable to enforce human rights 
standards, the government is the principal violator of these standards. This catch-22 is 
proof of Mutua’s claim that “there is an implicit tension in the relationship between states 
and rights: states are simultaneously a threat to human rights and their principal 
protector.”102 Slaughter likewise argues that human rights becomes an “enabling fiction” 
when the narrative of human rights promises more than it can deliver.103 
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“It is not the politician’s families or children who were hurt in those wars. It is 
more the middle class,” said David. “They suffered for no reason. Nobody dared to take 
care of them.” The human rights movement in its current state may further alienate or 
polarize groups, intensify the power struggle between civilians and the political elite. 
“The issue of power is largely ignored in the human rights corpus,” according to Mutua. 
“It is equally important that it also address deeply lopsided power relations among and 
within cultures, national economies, states, genders, religions, races and ethnic groups, 
and other societal cleavages.”104 The human rights movement needs a serious re-
imagining and reorientation of its hierarchal view of the world.105 Before it can be 
appropriately applied to a complex, multilayered, highly contested narrative context like 










Chapter 5: Emerging Voices 
 
5.1 What Does The Future Look Like? 
 
If the human rights program carries an internal contradiction, if certain frames are 
culturally dissonant, and ineffective in reversing power struggles, then what applications 
can the Congolese people look to? Can the program still offer certain tools to the 
Congolese? What is the most effective way of realizing rights?  
The metaphysical plight of the Congolese: they have suffered under an 
authoritarian regime that has ravaged the country for almost twenty-five years (forty 
years in total, interrupted by the four years of democracy in the early 1990s). Some have 
never known a different regime; as a child, teenager, and adult, they have had the same 
President. It is therefore difficult to conceive of an alternate vision of the future, because 
they have never known anything other. Feelings fluctuate between deep resentment and 
resignation that things will not change, or will get worse before they can ever get better. 
The future that they imagine is a nightmare that seems to follow a downhill trajectory: 
President Sassou Nguesso will attempt to transfer his Presidential seat to his son, who 
may do even worse damage to the country; like a burning pot that finally boils over, the 
people will resist this attempt; Southern tribes will take revenge against the Northern 
tribes; a gruesome civil war will follow; complete anarchy; the end. Their notion of time 
and change is therefore collided, ironic and tragic. Here is a long-term, psychological side 
effect of trauma caused by repressive regimes. It is a handicap to the potential of 
collective healing. 
The Congolese know the truth behind dominant narratives. They know that Congo 
is not a poor country, quite the contrary, it is rich in resources, minerals, oils, and an 
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abundantly fresh climate for agriculture. They know that colonialism is not dead, as they 
have to endure it in many subversive, thinly disguised forms.  They know that the roots of 
ethnic division and human rights abuses are top-down, political conflict. The diaspora 
contend and argue with those narratives. Most astonishing, and perhaps the most 
destructive, is the narrative they do believe:  Congo-Brazzaville does not have a future.  
This work provides an alternative vision of the future by directly targeting 
dominant narratives: Congo is a poor nation, ethnic conflict is the root cause to human 
rights abuses, colonialism is “history” or dead, and that Congo has no future. Yet the 
mechanism of a truth commission dares to propose an alternate vision of the future by 
creating a clear and truthful narrative of the past. It can dig up the suppressed narratives 
and brings them out of hiding. “But overall, the truth commission name has caught on, 
and has now become a term with a generally understood meaning: an official 
investigation into a past pattern of abuses.”106 This proposes a course of action that does 
not forfeit a future or hope, but inspires it: 
To pay close attention to how strategically oppressors break down 
narratives and why they are intent on doing so. To focus particularly on 
transitional justice, which, by definition, is the founding of a political and 
moral community through the narration of past horrors. 
Transitional justice recognizes that the past is not dead. It is a strategic 
confrontation, where the how and the why of mass crimes need to be un-
braided – deep, time-consuming, analytical work that requires a 
heightened sensitivity… The beauty and the agony of this kind of study is 
that it requires you to rewind, pause, dismantle history, agonize over 
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detail, piece together a living document, and leave something tangible (a 
rule of law), and whole (a cohesive narrative, a unified voice) for the next 
generation.107 
For those in the Congolese community to whom human rights are a perpetual fiction, 
transitional justice offers an autonomous course of action108: it clarifies and puts a high 
premium on the need for truth.  It is a critical vehicle on the roadmap of effectively 
realizing rights.  
 
5.2 The Right to Truth 
	
The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) did a 
comprehensive study on the right to truth as an “inalienable and autonomous right”.109 
Transitional justice has strategic, tactical approaches that engages with this right, and has 
a specific goal to unearth the suppressed narratives, build a collective memory and create 
a public record. Because false narratives have caused much damage in the perception of 
the Congolese identity and experience, then “truth” must be sought and fought for via a 
public platform. The right to truth is a valuable reference point precisely because it 
engages a practical and applicable mechanism of a truth commission, in order to create a 
space for civil society to express itself, a space for a suppressed history to emerge.  
As this work has assumed the task of pursuing primary voices and flipping 
dominant narratives, likewise truth commissions use “qualitative variables” by “looking 
at the narratives of people’s stories, looking at the why questions”.110 A truth commission 
can reconcile the different versions of history, and bring the subtext to the foreground. 
This work defines reconciliation111 as “reconciling contradictory facts or stories” and “the 
facing of unwelcome truths in order to harmonize incommensurable world views so that 
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inevitable and continuing conflicts and differences stand at least within a single universe 
of comprehensibility.”112 It is an approach that counters the dominant narratives and 
builds a history from what has been violently suppressed and narrated by those in power. 
 
5.3 Recommendations 
The former President of the International Center for Transitional Justice, and also 
the first UN Special Rapporteur on truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-
recurrence, Pablo de Greiff, said that there are set challenges to transitional justice: it is 
indifferent to context, formulaic, technocratic.113 To avoid these kinds of failures, it is 
important to have a structure that can confront Congo’s destructive narratives, be 
culturally harmonious, and stay relevant to the specific context. This thesis makes a very 
urgent proposal to build a creative and strategic response, shaped as a truth commission,  
in order to consolidate Congolese voices about Congo’s most pressing concerns. 
 
CONGODEEPLY  This truth commission will not appear in the same form as 
previous commissions but, for Congo’s sake, will come in a freshly energized and 
adaptable multi-platform organism to address a volume of needs and core concerns.  
A living organism that can successfully grapple with the depth of Congo’s issues is 
hereby referred to as CongoDeeply.114  
 
STRUCTURE This independent organism consists of three mutually reinforcing 
core teams: 1) intelligence, 2) memory and innovation, and 3) creative media.  
 
WORK FLOW  The truth commission’s mode of operations will include audacious 
and comprehensive documentation, research, and storytelling. The focus is on the untold 
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history, the hidden narrative, and building those elements into a library that will be 
accessible to the world. In order to best confront a multi-faceted set of issues that come 
with this kind of focus, the commission would necessarily involve a cross-disciplinary 
team of experts and specialists. 
 
INTELLIGENCE The team will include legal experts, investigators, human rights 
officers, political scientists, economists, and researchers. They will work as an 
intelligence research and analysis unit, looking not only at Congo’s insides, but also at 
the role of international actors. This is based on the important premise that the Congolese 
people and diaspora have a right to truth about the country’s politics and economy. How 
do they operate? Who are the masterminds? “Follow the money” will be a critical 
strategy given Congo’s colonial history and all the moving parts that are involved in its 
markets, resources, debts and profits. The team will work with a strong code of ethics that 
promotes transparency. It will build a historical and contemporary record of the factors 
that reflects a deeper reality of the Congolese identity and existential crisis. As a point of 
reference, the research will start from the 1990s, from which emerged the first and only 
democracy, quickly succeeded by violence repression orchestrated by the current 
administration, in order to arrive at the reality of failing human rights standards that the 
Congolese suffer today. Ultimately, this team would approach the central questions: 
What has happened, and what has made it possible for these events to happen? 
Any reconciliation of truth would be ineffective without the whole truth, the big 
picture of geopolitics. It is an extremely rare achievement but this kind of research within 
a truth commission does have one precedent. The truth commission in Chad, for example, 
named the U.S. as an entity financially supporting the violence. This project will build 
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upon the following precedent: 
Most truth commissions have not investigated this international role at any 
depth; few have addressed the issue at all in their final report. The truth 
commission in Chad perhaps ventured the furthest in this area. While not 
entering into in-depth investigation, the commission report names the 
exact amount of external financial backing provided to the regime, as well 
as the extent of training for the intelligence service responsible for the 
worst abuses—facts that were not previously well known by the public or 
the international human rights community…115 
Repression is a reality achieved not only by violence, but also by all the overt and 
subliminal tactics in keeping the mass population under complete submission. If the truth 
emerges, the world will know the patterns, forces, habits, and systems that need to be 
restructured/demolished/remade.  
 
MEMORY & INNOVATION The team will include historians, anthropologists, 
sociologists, social workers, rapporteurs, researchers, translators, and administrators.  
They will focus on qualitative research and documentation by collecting testimony from 
the Congolese people and the diaspora, and creating an official record of memory. This 
reinforces the need for Congolese voices as “primary stakeholders”:116  
 “The great number of interviews with victims, typical of these 
commissions, allows a detailed accounting of the patterns of violence over 
time and across regions, literally recording a hidden history. The detail 
and breadth of information in a truth commission report is usually of a 
kind and quality far better than any previous historical account, leaving the 
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country with a written and well-documented record of otherwise oft-
disputed events.”117 
A suppressed civil society is symptomatic of repressive regimes. If, as experts and 
research show, that there has never been a successful transition without a strong civil 
society118 then this can be point of access for the Congolese to be agents of change. This 
allows for a platform that can address difficult, but necessary questions: How should we 
remember? Who will write our history? Who are we? What does the future look like?  
In this sense, the team will have a historical perspective, and a forward-thinking 
orientation. Restorative practices can offer guiding questions and “collaborative problem-
solving”: 119 “The key element is interaction between the participants in a safe 
environment, focusing on acknowledgement of the past hurt and the emotions it has 
generated, disabusing stereotypes of each other and providing a future orientation which 
is mutually discussed and agreed.”120 This will create a charged feedback loop of 
historical resonance, and future innovation.  
Consider Rwanda’s gacaca courts based on the idea of “justice on the grass” 
before colonization, according to Olivier,121 Senior Political/Electoral Affairs Officer in 
the UN’s Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. As a Rwandan who spent 
time in both Congos, he has an extensive knowledge about the rise and fall of political 
regimes in the African context.  After one million people were killed in three months in 
Rwanda, Olivier said, and wise leaders were killed or had killed others, they had to 
answer the question, how do you render justice when the entire judiciary is destroyed?  
The Rwandan public elected wise leaders – the notion of people of integrity – which 
included women, and youth, and as a community, they processed what had happened, and 
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built a narrative to prevent future atrocities. It was the first time victims were able to 
express themselves. It was a leap forward in sustainable change in institutions, culture 
and disposition. This justice mechanism led by civil society was one of the critical 
turning points in bringing Rwanda out of the depths of its ashes. 
	
CREATIVE  The team includes videographers, writers, filmmakers, 
photographers, producers, artists and cultural influencers. They will take the intelligence 
data, qualitative research, and narratives and broadcast them in multi-media platforms. 
The Congolese experience as a form of historical and intellectual property can promote 
education, awareness, and public dialogue about Congo’s troubled history. They can pull 
from the stream of intelligence, memory and innovation in order to put these stories of 
the Congo on the global map.  
Alongside documents, reports, and analyses that offer a clear vision for the 
necessity of human rights, what they are, and what it means for each person to be a 
rights-holder, a truth commission can also explore creative alternatives to communicate 
its findings and respond to the question, what does it mean represent history with dignity? 
Art and media have the intrinsic potential to challenge or invert power relations, and 
triumph through social struggles. Scholars have claimed that the human rights world has 
excluded art to its own detriment, given that the role of art is to see across boundaries; 
question orthodoxy; reveal complexities; offer spaces for polarities, contradictions; 
invoke engagement and multiple intelligences.122  
It is beneficial for a truth commission to break outside of its silo mentality, and 
collapse rigid walls in order to bring its discoveries to a broader audience. It should have 
porous borders with art and culture – films, documentaries, mini-series, animated shorts, 
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and podcasts are just a few innovate expressions that have universal cultural currency. 
The presentation of these dynamic forms of storytelling can connect the Congolese 
identity, history and culture with the rest of the world. 
 
5.4 Closing Remarks 
This project does not make light of the fact that Congo needs a holistic, 
systematic restructuring and reimagining. That includes: a bullet-proof constitution; a 
leader of particular integrity, stamina and vision; reformation of its economy; law 
enforcement; a new judicial system; funding and revision of its health and education 
systems; a market that encourages and sustains free enterprise; and more, more, more. 
That is to say, it needs a rebirth.  
Wisdom reminds us that it is important to build on the infrastructure and culture 
of the local context. But you cannot build without the reality of who you are and what 
you came from, and if anything, a truth commission forces you to face history, and face 
yourself.123 A truth commission can “reveal a global truth of the broad patterns of events, 
and demonstrate without question the atrocities that took place and what forces were 
responsible.”124 Congo would therefore not defined by her past, but informed by it.  
It is a keen moment for the reconciliation of the truth, precisely because the 
current regime perceives itself to be eternal. This is an Achilles heel. It has forgotten 
what it means to be challenged; it has forgotten that it is an old and tired regime. Are 
Congolese voices enough? Sometimes a small pressure point, a hairline fracture, is 
enough to make the final coup. 
 
*Author’s Note: The individuals interviewed for this research have been given an alias 
in order to protect their identity, livelihood, and privacy.  
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